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Abstract:	   A systematic approach is presented to 
constructing a radiation assurance case using Goal 
Structured Notation (GSN) for spacecraft containing 
COTS parts. The GSN paradigm is applied to an SRAM 
single-event upset experiment board designed to fly on a 
CubeSat November 2016. Construction of a radiation 
assurance case without use of hardened parts or extensive 
radiation testing is discussed.  
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I. Introduction 
The use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts by 
now has become common in CubeSats or NASA-
designated “Sub-Class D” missions [1], which are low 
cost, short duration, relatively high-risk missions often 
designed with minimal radiation hardening. This 
approach to dealing with space radiation hazards is 
completely different from NASA Class A missions, such 
as a space telescope, which are high-budget, long-lifetime 
missions using almost entirely hardened components in an 
effort to minimize variation of key variables and reduce 
system risk. However, a minimal assurance standard for 
Sub-Class D missions is permitted and desirable. Hence it 
becomes useful and important to construct an assurance 
case concerning radiation exposure for a Sub-Class D 
mission such as a Cube Sat. At issue is how to represent a 
realistic assurance case for reducing the risk of radiation 
degradation of a Sub-Class D spacecraft without relying 
on standard, but resource-intensive radiation hardening 
strategies and components used for mission-critical 
systems in high-value Class A or B missions.  
Radiation effects on electronic components are a 
significant reliability issue for systems intended for space. 
Charge deposition from single-events can result in soft 
errors, such as a temporary bit value change in a memory 
cell, or damage to an electronic device such as single-
event latch up.  The goal of this effort is to use GSN as a 
paradigm to create a safety case to assure the single-event 
robustness of a Cube Sat test board intended for low earth 
orbit (LEO) and composed primarily of COTS 
components. 
II. Assurance Cases and Goal Structure Notation 
for Spaceflight 
An assurance case provides for a logical structure to show 
that a system is meeting the necessary reliability and 
safety objectives to achieve mission success. NASA and 
other organizations responsible for assurance have 
recognized that increasing efficiency, flexibility and 
effectiveness in the assurance realm can be achieved with 
this approach [2].  This paper reflects these improvements 
for mission assurance as applied to the development of 
small spacecraft with COTS parts having to perform in a 
low Earth orbit radiation environment. 
The assurance case emerges from the safety case ideal. 
NASA’s Risk Informed Safety Case (RISC) is “a 
structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, 
which provides a compelling, comprehensible, and valid 
case that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given 
application in a given environment” [3]. An assurance 
case extends this concept beyond safety alone. 
Figure 1 illustrates some basic elements of the case, in 
which a claim about the system is supported by detailed 
technical evidence, design details and analysis. The case 
is broken down in a hierarchical fashion to greater detail 
consistent with the desired level of indenture for the
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Figure 1. Illustration of Risk-Informed Safety Case 
Hierarchy in which a claim about the safety of a 
system must be supported by evidence. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160005315 2019-08-31T03:21:56+00:00Z
	   
system under consideration.  The generation of evidence 
for the top level claim emerges with the design and the 
safety case evolves through the life cycle. Goal Structured 
Notation (GSN) supports the development of the 
assurance case. As reflected in this paper, GSN, 
developed at York University, utilizes logic-based 
structures and symbols to drive a hierarchy that is the 
substance and evidence of the safety or assurance case. 
An assurance case may be effectively started for a 
spacecraft system with a preliminary structure that 
reflects the necessary considerations and objectives for 
successful missions.  An objectives hierarchy forming the 
basis of NASAs new Reliability Standard was developed 
using a modified version of Goal Structure Notation [2]. 
GSN was used to structure defined objectives and sub-
objectives, while mapping them with strategies that are 
used to accomplish the various objectives to create an 
objectives hierarchy for a successful mission.  This 
hierarchy forms the basis of making claims about the 
reliability of a spaceflight system and presents the 
necessary considerations for achieving the top level goal. 
This provides a starting point for the emergence of a 
detailed GSN based assurance or safety case as 
demonstrated below. 
This approach is greatly facilitated by the emergence of 
the Model Based Systems Engineering. System 
knowledge embodied by the models is drawn on for the 
assurance or safety case. The case itself can exist as a 
linked hierarchy facilitating a model centered design 
environment with a “single source of truth” rather than a 
document centered environment in which assurance 
products may lag the design. 
III. GSN Assurance Case for Single Event Latch 
Up in Low Earth Orbit 
The exemplar system for this methodology is an existing 
research project at Vanderbilt, a Cube Sat-based 
experiment designed to operate with COTS parts. A 
circuit board designated the “Radiation Environment 
Modelling” (REM) board has been designed to test static 
random access memory (SRAM) for single-event upsets 
in LEO. The SRAMs are fabricated in a 28 nm CMOS 
technology, for which Vanderbilt has plentiful electrical 
and radiation test data. The Cube Sat is scheduled to 
launch in August 2016. Working on a radiation hardness 
assurance case for this CubeSat design serves as a 
demonstration vehicle to apply the GSN modeling 
methodology and focus the GSN application on a real 
system. In this section we present an assurance case for 
the radiation reliability of this SRAM test board in the 
Cube Sat using the GSN paradigm.  
A simplified block diagram of the REM experiment board 
is shown in Fig. 2. The SRAM requires different power 
supply voltages for the memory core, the input/output 
(I/O) circuitry, and the control logic. Each of these has a 
separate voltage regulator. Each regulator can potentially 
experience single-event latch up (SEL), and therefore is 
controlled by a load switch that can disconnect the 
regulator from the power bus if an overcurrent is detected. 
Likewise the microcontroller is a bulk CMOS technology 
and can experience latch up, so it must send a renewal 
signal to a watch-dog timer periodically or be reset by its 
load switch.  
While the single-event experiment is being conducted, the 
SRAM is written with a known data pattern, for example, 
all ones, or a checkerboard pattern. Periodically the data 
pattern is checked by the microcontroller and nodes where 
a bit change has occurred are recorded by the 
microcontroller as single-event errors. Since the SRAM 
has a large amount of memory, and is a commercial 
unhardened device, bit-flips occur often enough to make 
the number of flips and the failure rate reliably 
measurable. In space the ion flux is omni-directional, so 
the test gives a true picture of the performance of the 
memory in a space environment, as opposed to a particle 
	  
Figure 2. Simplified block Diagram of REM board architecture showing load disconnect switches for multiple supply 
voltages. (“WD” is an abbreviation for watch-dog timer.) 
	  accelerator for which the particle beam is uni-directional. 
In this paper we mainly consider the effect of single-
events on the system performance, although the same 
reliability methodology could be extended to total-
ionizing dose or other radiation environments.  
Figure 3 shows a general GSN fragment for the goal of 
measuring the single event upsets (SEU) in a low earth 
orbit for one year. In standard GSN [4] the functionality 
of blocks or nodes on the graph is identified through the 
shape of the box describing the node, in our notation we 
are using rectangles for all functions, which are color-
coded and labeled by function to make the automatic 
generation of GSN structures by software easier. This 
formal GSN architecture is adapted from [2], in which a 
particular structure of goals and strategies is 
recommended to meet the requirements of NASA’s 
Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) standards.  
In GSN structures, the root or top-level node is a 
particular goal, which in Fig. 3 is related to the 
functionality of the experiment, in this case to measure 
SEUs in a commercial 28 nm CMOS bulk SRAM in LEO 
for a period of one year. The GSN paradigm allows for 
the use of context nodes that point the reader to various 
relevant context facts, such as existing mathematical or 
software models of the device, specific mission 
constraints, the radiation environment the device can 
expect to encounter, design or specification documents, 
and so forth. Here the context is the behavior of the 
experiment, the limitations of the mission, the LEO 
radiation environment, and the functional model of the 
experiment board. A typical GSN structure will have an 
alteration of goals and strategies to meet those goals. The 
strategies and goals shown in Fig. 3 are the general ones 
specified by NASA in [2].  
Figure 4 shows more specifically how the NASA R&M 
criteria are applied to the REM board with respect to the 
reliability issue of single-event latchup. One strategy to 
meet goal 2.A.1 is to perform qualification testing to 
verify functionality for intended use. In the context of 
Sub-Class D missions, limited resources are available for 
testing. A justification node is added to document the 
reasoning behind the limited testing chosen in this case. 
Only proton testing was performed because the heavy-ion 
contribution to upsets is significantly less than the proton 
contribution for LEO. Two of the three load switches on 
the board were tested in the proton beam. The results of 
the test are documented in “Solution” nodes that form the 
termination of this particular line of goal/strategy 
reasoning. In addition the third load switch was not tested 
but was part of the same parts family and judged to be 
similar enough to allow the third part based on the 
existing proton test data, an assumption that is captured in 
a “Justification” node.  
IV. Discussion of GSN for Assurance Cases 
The utility of the application of GSN to the process of 
building an assurance case can be seen in the foregoing 
discussion. First, the GSN structure imposes some 
discipline and rigor on the assurance case development 
process. Second, the GSN approach surfaces and 
identifies assumptions that are made during the safety 
assessment. Third, the GSN safety case makes the main 
structure of the assurance argument visible and easily 
understandable to reviewers who are evaluating the 
validity of the assurance case. This is opposed to a 
document-centric approach, in which the assurance case is 
made in text, where assumptions may remain hidden and 
relationships between goals and strategies may be 
obscured. Finally, the GSN graph is modular and easily 
related to functional blocks of the system under 
discussion, which means it is well-suited to accompany a 
model-based representation of a system such as might be 
found in model-based system engineering tools such as 
the Systems Modeling Language or SysML.   
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Figure 3. Generalized NASA R&M GSN template applied 
to the REM board latch up assurance case. 
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